Cipient predication: Unifying double object, dative experiencer and existential/presentational constructions

By Patrick Brandt
Reviewed by Heidi Harley

Summary by the author

This dissertation argues that there is a unique structural core shared by Double Object, Dative Experiencer and Existential/Presentational Constructions (DOCs, DECs and PTCs respectively):

(1) Anna sent Otto the letter (to the office) [DOC]
(2) The enemy escaped Otto (into the woods) [DEC]
(3) There [was, appeared] a man (in the bar) [PTC]

The constructions exemplified in (1) to (3) each encode a particular predication structure with a subject typically bearing dative case. This dative subject is baptized 'cipient', the term intended to replace traditional notions such as (affected) source/goal, recipient, indirect object or dative experiencer (cf. re-, per- cipient).

The predication structure argued to be instantiated in (1) to (3) looks as follows:

(4) [tPOtto [tthere [VP the enemy [V' escaped [PPinto the woods]]]]]

(4) encodes the ascription of a property to the cipient subject (Otto in (1) and (2), cf. below for PTCs). From the bottom up, the crucial features of (4) are the following:
– the VP comprises a theme and a location argument
– a temporal head 'little t' forms a predicate from the material in the VP
– the cipient expression saturates the predicate as an external argument bearing structural (dative) case

The input to predicate formation is a propositional meaning embedded in the VP, expressing that something (the theme argument’s referent) is at a certain location (the location argument’s referent). The location argument comes with a free variable, ranging over locations that comprise the location argument’s referent as a part. It is this variable that the cipient argument ‘binds’: cipients are superlocations of VP location arguments.

(5) shows the interpretive steps corresponding to the nodes in (4) in terms of operator-variable structure, with x (=theme) ranging over ‘ordinary’ (person/thing/stuff-referring) individuals. p and w range over locations and R encodes the relation between p and w (minimally: part-whole); i is a variable ranging over indices (usually times, but cf. below):

(5) (a) VP := ∃p AT(x,p,i) & R(p,w)
(b) t := λw[∃p AT(x,p,i) & R(p,w)]
(c) tp := λw[∃p AT(x,p,i) & R(p,w)](Otto) = ∃p AT(x,p,i) & R(p,Otto)

1. Predication licensing cipients

The thesis proposes that cipients (dative re-, percipients) are licensed as external arguments and logical subjects of predication, where predication involves at least three ingredients: a subject, a predicate, and a tense/index (cf. already Aristotle). In the generative tradition, T(ense)/I(nflection) as encoding (non)finite-ness is standardly assumed to establish the predicational nexus. For the (tense) head, the thesis seeks to motivate (6):

(6) The t head encodes a bifurcation of truth intervals at (what is traditionally called) the Reference Time Level

If cipients are licensed by material pertaining to the tense system, it follows that they uniformly exhibit external argument behavior. For example, cipients do not occur in certain ‘small clause’ structures that are standardly assumed to be tenseless, and they do not take part in word- or idiom formation (standardly assumed to be lexical processes). Patterns observed with DOCs and ‘small infinitives’ support the...
The hypothesis that cipient licensing involves the tense system: DOCs allow ‘double’ temporal modification, suggesting that they correspond to two fully fledged (i.e., tensed/indexed) predication structures. ‘Small infinitives’ have been argued to lack T(P) (Wurmband, 1999) but allow temporal modification just in case a cipient is licensed as well. Further, cipients pattern with subjects of Individual Level Predicates (e.g. know, love, cf. Carlson, 1978), prominently analyzed as being licensed by the T(ense) system at base (Diesing, 1992; Kratzer, 1995). Like subjects of Individual Level Predicates, cipients behave like presupposition-carrying expressions: they disallow partial extraction, they cannot be picked up by pronouns compatible only with non-topic expressions (cf. Reinhart, 1995), they are illicit in the scope of all focus particles (e.g. only), and they appear to scope out of embedded belief contexts. Assuming that presuppositionality can be equated with an independent (definite) temporal interpretation (Carnap, 1928; Eng, 1981; Musan, 1995), an analysis of the blocking effects associated with cipients is offered:

(7) (a) Este taxista (*me) parece <este taxista>
   This taxi-driver (to-me) seems <taxi dr.>
   cansado
   tired
(b) The door opened *(for) Max
   (cf. He opened Max the door/the door for Max)

According to the proposal, cipients not only bind the superlocation argument slot created by t(ense), they also narrow down the possible temporal/ indexical values of the propositional meaning predicated of them. Adopting Chomsky’s recent idea that the grammar gets rid of structure as soon as it can be interpreted (represented) in independent terms, merger of a cipient forces spellout of the verbal projection, comprising the theme. The theme needs to enter a case relation with T(ense), but it is not part of the structure anymore when T(ense) is merged.

2. Cipient Locations
Cipients are presented as locations relating to a VP internal location argument: the cipient denotes a location including the VP location argument as a part. It is proposed that the interpretation as a location is reflected in the grammatically relevant feature-makeup of cipients. In particular, it is argued that number information is inaccessible on cipients, and that this explains the binding illness observed with cipients, cf.:

(8) (a) ?*Otto zeigte ihnen SICH
   Otto showed them SICH
(b) *Otto gave Emil, a steak hungry

The proposal is that certain (empty) anaphoric elements depend on number information on their antecedents, but that cipients do not provide this information. The features describing cipients are like those of mass terms in this respect, furnishing part information but not count information.

The presence of a (silent) VP-internal location argument in the constructions under discussion is pivotal for the analysis. It is argued for on the basis of among other (anti)binding patterns, codistribution with location-argument dependent elements and adverb scope. If the constructions comprise a VP location argument that bears a part-whole relation (up to identity) to the cipient, a seeming paradox pertaining to scope and A(ntecedent) C(ontained) D(letion) in DOCs has a simple solution, cf. (9):

(9) (a) Otto gave a ???different beggar every coin
    (b) Otto gave a beggar everything Emil did

Universally quantified themes cannot distribute over cipients under normal circumstances, suggesting that Q(uantifier)R(aising) of the theme over the cipient is blocked (‘scope freezing’, cf. the blocking effects illustrated in (7)). However, for the ACD structure QR seems required. If the theme did not raise to a position from where it c-commanded the cipient variable, the operator variable structure comprising the right variables could not be constructed and an infinite regress structure as sketched in (10) would be looking for an interpretation at the interface (cf. May, 1985):

(10) Otto gave a beggar [everything Emil gave a beggar [everything Emil gave a beggar [...]]]

Supposing that the VP location argument furnishes the variable needed for the ACD structure, the theme can QR (overtly) to a position below the cipient and no paradox arises.

3. The cipient predicate
Apart from projecting a location argument that is interpreted as part of the cipient, the cipient structure is argued to be conditioned by (11) (cf. (6) above):

(11) Interpreting the cipient structure involves reference to two dissociated truth intervals

Eventive (telic/change of state) predicates obey (11) if they are represented as state-change over time: propositional meanings correspond to the pre- and post state of the event respectively, holding at dissociated times on the time axis (cf. Galton, 1984). With few systematic exceptions (typically involving body-part denoting location arguments), predicates licensing cipients are change of state (cf. (12a,b)). Cipients prominently occur in comparative/evaluative constructions as well, however (cf. (12c)):

(12) (a) Die Lampe fiel ihm zu Boden
    The lamp fell him-DAT to ground (change)
(b) *Die Lampe fiel ihm
    The lamp fell him-DAT (no change)
(c) Die Suppe ist ihm *(zu) heiss (comparative/evaluative)  
The soup is him-DAT (too) hot  
(cf. the soup is ?*(too) hot for him)  
(German, similarly e.g. Hungarian, Greek)

(12a) and (12c) are both argued to fall under the proposed analysis: in the comparative/evaluative case, an adjective takes the place of the verb, and a degree element takes the place of the preposition (note the crosslinguistically frequent homonymy of the prepositional element to and the degree element too). Concerning the interpretive condition in (11), it is proposed that in the comparative/evaluative case, truth intervals correspond to degrees to which certain properties are instantiated by certain things. Interpreting a comparative/evaluative construction entails reference to two dissociated indices: a degree standard and a degree of actual instantiation ‘outside’ that standard.

The reality of (11) is supported by the fact that predicates licensing cipients form a subclass of predicates occurring felicitously in perfect tense as encoding anteriority/posteriority. In essence, perfect tense involves reference to two temporal indices at the Reference Time level: there is a t before/after now and before/after that there is a t’ at which a propositional meaning holds (cf. Reichenbach, 1947). Predicates licensing cipients happily occur in perfect tense, predicates that do not (e.g. Individual Level Predicates as such) do not. To the extent that the proposed analysis is on the right track, it provides an argument against conceiving of events as primitives. Instead, events should be represented as change occurring over time, along the lines proposed by von Wright (1965).

4. Presentational There Constructions (PTCs)
As said above (cf. section 1), it is proposed that cipient subjects function among other as ‘anchors’ for propositional meanings: the times (indices) at which the propositional meaning predicated of the cipient holds are included in the times/indices at which the cipient is ‘in existence’. PTCs do not feature a cipient, nor other logical subject. In the spirit of Freeze (1992), it is argued that there is not a D/NP argument, but rather the spellout of location agreement features on t. The temporal/indexical value of the propositional meaning encoded in PTCs is then not determined in the structure; PTCs remain unsaturated expressions in syntax, corresponding to the (lambda abstracted) cipient predicate. Building on in particular Heim’s (1987) and McNally’s (1998) analyses of definiteness effects in PTCs, it is proposed that this is the reason why certain D/NPs (most/every N) cannot appear in PTCs:

(13) (a) *There were most linguists at the conference  
(b) *There appeared every kid at school

In essence, the D/NPs that cannot appear in PTCs are those that only have denotations as generalized quantifiers – for these to be meaningful, the first set must be non-empty. Not being hooked to a context by the subject expression, PTCs do not comprise the indexical information that is required to ensure that the first set is not empty, hence D/NPs denoting generalized quantifiers end up uninterpretable in PTCs. The interpretive properties of PTCs embedded under speech-act verbs as well as patterns with speech-act-oriented adverbs provide evidence that PTCs are in fact ‘poorer’ than ‘normal’ sentences as far as their properties pertaining to temporal reference and force encoding are concerned. The proposal that the theme argument is interpreted with respect to the cipient referent also yields an explanation of the scope freezing effects associated with DOCs and DECs (themes cannot distribute over cipients under normal circumstances, cf. (9a) above). For the theme to take scope over the cipient would mean for the theme to outscope the very indices with respect to which it is interpreted.

Acknowledgement (Patrick Brandt)
Many thanks to Jenny Doetjes for her patience and help with this summary. This is also an opportunity to thank Henriette de Swart for her help at earlier stages of writing the thesis; shamefully, she is missing in the acknowledgments. Finally, David Basilico’s paper ‘Object Position and Predication Forms’ has been important for the development of some of the thesis’ ideas. I feel that this is not acknowledged enough in the dissertation.

Review by Heidi Harley
It was a little worrying being asked to review a dissertation about ‘cipient predication’ when I didn’t know what a ‘cipient’ was, but the subtitle promised discussion of questions directly abutting my own interests, so I agreed. I’m glad I did; it’s been a rewarding experience. While I (almost inevitably) don’t find myself converted entirely from my own views by Brandt’s proposal, I have found considerable food for thought.

Not the least of his contributions is the term ‘cipient’, the result of reducing to its (nominalized) essentials the -ceive root that is the canonical example of a cran-morph that I use in undergraduate classes. (Cran has been taken away from us by OceanSpray and its cran-apple, cran-grape, cran-you-name-it drinks, of course.) If Brandt’s term takes hold, now cipient and its root may go the same route as cran, but it’ll still work on undergraduates, and I am gratified to have a useful, evocative term for the miscellaneous ragbag of dative-marked possessors/experimenters/goals/malefactives/benefactives/causeses/affectees that are clearly a natural class of some kind. (Below, I confess that I think the natural class is in fact quite a bit larger than Brandt characterizes it, but I...
plan to call them all cipients in the future anyway, begging his pardon for misapplying his term to the larger group.)

Brandt proposes to license/introduce cipients as the subjects of a predication in what he terms Spec-tP, a functional projection whose job is providing an index for reference time (as opposed to utterance time); intuitively, to me, it corresponds to what Travis (1991) and others have termed ‘Outer Aspect’, the locus of viewpoint aspect. This projection is outside of vP; any agent must raise around any cipient argument to reach the subject position in SpecTP (it is able to do so because v fuses/head-moves to t, and consequently is at the phase edge with the cipient argument).

Cipients, in Spec-tP, are predicated of a locational proposition that Brandt calls ‘Thing@Loc’; they bind an open location variable within the proposition. The variable they bind is one representing the ‘whole’ part of a metonymic part-whole relation in the complement to tP. So if Anna sent Otto a letter to the office, Otto is a superlocation encompassing (temporally and/or spatially) the ‘letter to the office’ thing@loc predication.

Among other things, Brandt uses the part/whole relation of the cipient with the (often null or incorporated into the verb) location argument to explain the backwards-binding possibilities attested with the dative experiencer type of cipient. The extra temporal position tP is appealed to in explaining the peculiar double temporal modification available with double object verbs. The predicative nature of tP is used to explain the definiteness/presuppositionality associated with cipients cross-linguistically, and also in a novel approach to the blocking effects associated with cipients. (They create islands, of a sort. Brandt appeals not to the standard locality line, but rather to a phase-theoretic notion: a complete, tensed predication can and therefore must be evaluated by the conceptual interface. If tP with cipient is a phase in this sense, then of course anything inside the phase will be trapped.)

As I say, I found a lot of very interesting, thought-provoking material in this dissertation. I thought I would first present a few nuggets that triggered extensive marginalia beginning with ‘Cool!’ or ‘Nice!’ in my copy. This is far from a representative sample, but they may at least give you the flavor.

Brandt shows that cipient arguments are not possible in the so-called ‘absolute constructions’: adjunct verbal participles headed by ‘with’ (p. 83). Contrast the cipient-containing vs. PP-containing absolute constructions in (1) and (2) below (I’ve modified Brandt’s examples somewhat so they’re more colloquial to my ear):

(1) a. With the petition (finally) sent to the government, the protesters took the week off.
   b. *With the government (finally) sent the petition, the protesters took the week off.

(2) a. With an elephant escaped from its cage, the zoo was in turmoil.
   b. *With an elephant escaped its cage, the zoo was in turmoil.

Brandt takes this to be evidence that if temporal functional superstructure is stripped away, the cipient argument has to go with it. These are very cool facts.

However, he mentions that it seems that the vP is still possible in these constructions, since agent arguments are still licensed in examples like (3):

(3) With Otto singing in our office, I’m certain to get a headache.

Unfortunately, this can’t be taken as a diagnostic for a higher cipient-licensing tP projection dominating an agent-licensing vP projection, since the participles are different; in (1) and (2) he exhibits an absolute with a passive/perfective participle; in (3), an absolute with a progressive participle. In fact, with the progressive participle, cipient arguments are still perfectly fine in absolute constructions:

(4) a. With the protesters sending the government a petition, the executives were nervous.
   b. With an elephant escaping its cage, the zoo was in turmoil.

So it seems clear that when you have the agent-licensing vP, the cipient-licensing projection, tP or whatever it is, is also available in the structure.

Brandt also shows that quantified cipients in double-object constructions can bind pronouns in temporal modifier clauses (p. 124; he gives the facts in German but these work the same in English, according to my judgment):

(5) a. Otto gave every visitor a roll when he came in.
   b. *Otto gave visitors every roll when it was freshly baked.

If this really indicates that the quantified cipient has scope over a when-clause in its base position, it would be a strong argument for a high, tense-related location for cipients. Two facts, however, lead me to think that the test may not be relevant to the question of where cipients are base generated. First, regular patient direct objects and ditransitive locations can also bind into when-clauses, and they are certainly not in any tP-like position:

(6) a. Grandma kissed every boy when he came in to say goodbye.
   b. Santa gave a present to every girl when she smiled for the picture.

Second, as Brandt notes in fn. 76, the base-generation account of cipient variable binding in when-clauses predicts that we should see Principle C effects, too, but they are weak-to-non-existent:

(7) Aaron read her, a story whenever Sophia asked him to.

These facts make me suspect that the binding of the variable in the when-clause is happening from the quantified arguments’ QR-ed position, and the failure
of binding from the quantified Theme in (5)b is an instance of the blocking effect induced by the cipient argument *visitors*, which Brandt shows with other constructions is quite a robust one. If cipients block other A-bar movements, as he argues on pp. 130–132, presumably they should block QR from within them in examples like (5)b here.

Finally, there are interesting facts extending the discussion about how degree predicates—in particular, comparatives, license cipients (p. 208, see also Brandt’s summary above). Brandt has just argued that the cipient structure requires two dissociated intervals, the interval associated with the action (Ranchor) and the interval associated with the resulting situation (Ract). A plain stative, adjectival predicate is not usually enough to license a cipient argument in German, as shown in (8) below:

(8) *Sue ist mir gross.*
   Sue is me-DAT tall.
   “Sue is tall for me/to my taste.”

Brandt says this is because there is no way to dissociate an anchor and situation interval in such a predicate. However, if the predicate is embedded in a comparative structure, the cipient is suddenly fine:

(9) Sue ist mir zu gross.
   Sue is me-DAT too tall.
   “Sue is too tall for me/to my taste.”

The introduction of the comparative, Brandt argues, brings along a standard against which the comparative must be evaluated. The standard allows a dissociation of Ranchor (the standard) from Ract (the actual degree of tallness). If the degree-scale can be homorphically mapped to the temporal scale in the standard change-of-state cipient construction above, the analysis predicts the licensing effect of the comparative in these constructions. The temporal and degree scales, he notes, interact interestingly in the following example:

(10) Der Mount Everest ist Otto nicht mehr hoch genug.
    The M. E. is Otto-DAT not anymore high enough.
    “Mount Everest is not high enough for Otto anymore.”

This sentence could be true in two ways, both involving a change of state implied by *any more*: one is if Mount Everest has suddenly shrunk so that it no longer meets or exceeds Otto’s standards of climbing challenge; the other is if Otto’s relevant standards have become so high that not even Mount Everest can meet them anymore.

My one reservation concerning the cipients-entailing-change account concerns the large class of stative psychological cipients: dative subjects of verbs like *want, understand, know, like*, etc., in various languages. Brandt touches on these here and there throughout the text, and clearly considers them part of the domain of explanation, but it is not clear to me how these clearly stative cipient constructions fit into the change-picture. (Brandt has an interesting and elegant account of why his other class of stative cipients, *there-*existentials, are allowed to be stative, but doesn’t address the psych verb cases).

This is only the tip of an iceberg of paradigms of facts that were new and interesting to me, and of interesting approaches to subtle problems that were scattered throughout the dissertation. I finished, however, with a feeling that the range of generalizations treated by the proposal is both over-broad and over-narrow, oddly enough.

On the over-broad side, it seems odd to me to lump together the presentationental *there* constructions (PTCs) and these other cipient constructions (double objects, adversity/benefactive constructions, etc.). Admittedly the basic idea that *there*-constructions are existentially bound cipientless cipient structures is quite attractive, but the overall discussion of the relationship between *there*-constructions, actual locative *there* and locative inversion constructions was somewhat disappointing. He doesn’t consider any of the arguments that the locative-inversion cases and the *there*-existentials are *not* related constructions, but simply goes over the case for identity (p. 33–35) and omits to address the case against. Further, the discussion of the PTCs in the rest of the text focuses exclusively on the *there* cases and almost not at all on the locative-inversion cases, although the latter should be a true cipient construction complete with cipient (the inverted subject PP), if I understand the treatment correctly. Yet, he doesn’t apply any of his tests for cipiency to such inverted PPs in English.

Throughout, Brandt makes arguments about *there* (the existential expletive) from facts that contain *there* (the deictic locative demonstrative). For example, as part of his argument that existential *there* behaves both like a phrasal constituent and a head, he adds the following example (p. 153), and comments that “...under the standard assumption that what can be coordinated must be of like category again points to the phrasal status of *there*”:

(11) [[There] and [in Chomsky, 1995]], it is claimed that...

Fair enough — but this isn’t expletive *there*, which cannot occur as an adjunct, but rather demonstrative *there*, which can; one can’t make arguments about the category of one based on the other. He goes on to assert that it’s important that the expletive *there* is clearly related to the demonstrative *there*—absolutely true, of course—but they are clearly not the same thing. In his final analysis, existential *there* ends up being the agreement realization of the *t* head, but he doesn’t discuss what he assumes about demonstrative *there*.

(Incidentally, assuming that Brandt would treat it as a PP proform, his account may predict an interesting difference between existential and demonstrative *there* pointed out to me by Andrea Moro (p.c.):
demonstrative *there* can precede a parenthetical, while existential *there* cannot:

(12) a. There is a solution.
   b. There, I think, is a solution
      (either demonstrative or existential)
      (only demonstrative, *existential*).

If existential *there* is a head, one would not expect it to be frontable to some specifier above a high-adjointed parenthetical, while a PP, of course, should allow such fronting.)

There are several other minor inconsistencies of the ‘over-broad’ type. In some cases, he does try out a purported test for cipient structure on all three of his cipient-type constructions, and in some cases it is not possible to try a given test for one reason or another, but in too many other places he presents an argument, tests it on one of the constructions, and moves on. For example, the *was-für* test pertaining to partial extraction on page 89 is shown only for the dative periphrastic constructions, but not for the double object construction (or the locative inverted case, which is ignored in tests for cipienthood throughout). Can one say the German equivalent of ‘What have you sent for politicians a petition?’ Brandt’s prediction is that it should be ungrammatical. Jenny Doetjes, (p.c.), informs me that it is grammatical in Dutch, but only with contrastive stress on the subject:

(13) Wat heb jij voor politici een what have you for politician a petition sent to what type of politicians did YOU send a petition?

I’m not sure what the stress requirement is telling us about extractability form the cipient here, obviously, but I feel like Brandt should have tested and discussed the equivalent German case.

All of the above is small potatoes, however, compared to my main complaint, which has to do with the ‘over-narrow’ end. It may seem rather cruel of me to be upset that a dissertation that is already 260 printed pages long (around 450 manuscript pages, I imagine!) has not covered enough material, but in this case it seems to me that many signs were pointing to two important ideas in the literature that are just crying out to be addressed in this framework, or at least mentioned somewhere in the discussion.

First, the well-known work of Snyder and Stromswold (1997), as well as that of Basilio, establishes both a syntactic and semantic parallel between double object constructions, verb-particle constructions, and resultatives like He *wiped the table clean*. Snyder and Stromswold argue both from cross-linguistic evidence and acquisition evidence that these three form a natural class in terms of their syntactic structure. Basilio has repeatedly argued, most recently in a 2003 LI article, that the subject of a resultative construction is subject to the same interpretive restrictions as the goal argument of a double object construction, particularly with regard to their presuppositionality. Since resultatives in particular don’t seem to require or even allow a location argument, I think it very important that Brandt investigate and determine whether or not they require a cipient analysis, in his terms, or if their presuppositional qualities have another source. Connected with this concern is the question of selected vs. unselected objects in such constructions, treated interestingly in connection with degree predicates by Weschler (2001) and Rappoport-Hovav and Levin (1999).

Second, and now very much bound up with my own interest in double-object constructions, I found Brandt’s discussion of the famous possession-connection to be pretty thin. This is particularly a shame since it seems to me that if anything, his analysis may make the case for a connection between ‘have’ constructions and double-object constructions stronger, rather than casting additional doubt on it.

Brandt notes that the cipient arguments he is dealing with can bear essentially any kind of relation to the theme, centering around some notion related to ‘affectedness’; strict possession is not the correct characterization of that relationship. However, as most thoroughly argued in the extremely interesting work of Belvin (1996), the same thing is true of the subject of *have* in English: it can be a possessor, but also possible are experiencer-type adversative or benefactive subjects as well as causative subjects. Most tellingly, straight locative subjects of *have* are also possible as long as a locative PP containing a pronoun co-indexed with the subject occurs lower in the structure:

(14) a. Possessive Calvin has a dog./The tree has green leaves.
    b. Locative Calvin has a bee *(on him)/The tree has a nest *(on it).
    c. Experiencer Calvin had a dog bite him on the calf.
    d. Causer Calvin had Hobbes keep watch for Susie.

Belvin develops a treatment of this range of data that crucially depends on the binding relation established by the coindexed pronoun in the complement to *have* as in (14)b,c above, and the property of set-inclusion (see also my related articles Harley, 1997; 1998). Brandt’s central proposal is almost eerily reminiscent of Belvin’s work, but he was unfortunately unaware of it. Further, despite citing Freeze (1992) extensively for his discussion of existentials and locatives, Brandt ignores a central facet of that proposal: that possessive constructions are simply a subtype of locative existentials. Given the possessive connection with cipients in the double object construction, which Brandt acknowledges but tries to downplay, one would have thought he’d at least mention the possibility that possessives might be amenable to analysis in his framework.

Perhaps he ignores this possibility because of the treatment of cipients’ person/number features which he adopts to account for their binding illness, particularly with respect to control and secondary predication. Adopting the idea that the subjects of *have* are
also cipients would entail allowing cipients to satisfy the EPP and check nominative case in English. It seems to me, however, that there is already plenty of reason to think that cipients can do this in English. Not only can they become the subject of a passive in English (which fact is acknowledged by Brandt but left unaccounted for), there is an increasingly significant body of evidence that verbs like get or receive are essentially unaccusative double-object constructions (see, e.g. Pesetsky, 1995 or Richards, 2001; compare the idiom transfer between John got the boot/Bill gave John the boot). It would be very interesting to see a thorough comparison of the properties of such subjects and unarguable cipients.

Be that as it may, Cipient Predication is a dense, data-rich, and well-thought-out proposal. The meat of the book is contained in two really enormous chapters, which are somewhat forbidding to get through, and there is a fairly high percentage of pages with minor typos or printers' errors on them, but it repays the attention it takes to get through it. I especially like the tight and thoroughly explained discussion of the syntax-semantics interface, and the use of economy considerations to force spell-out of any structure that can be interpreted; it's rare to find a proposal that is both syntactically and semantically interesting and well-motivated. Cipient Predication is both.

Acknowledgement
Many thanks to Andrew McIntyre for comments on an earlier draft of this review. Errors and opinion remain entirely my responsibility, of course.

References